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Abstract: Preserving invariants while designing distributed applications under weak consistency
models is difficult. The CEC (Correct Eventual Consistency Tool) is meant to aid the application
designer in this task. It provides information about the errors during concurrent operations and
suggestions on how and where to synchronize operations. This report presents two features of the
tool: providing a counterexample for debugging and concurrency control suggestions.
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Résumé : Dans les applications réparties s’exécutant dans un modèle de cohérence faible, le
maintien des invariants est un problème difficile. L’outil CEC (Correct Eventual Consistency)
est destiné à aider le développeur d’application dans cette tâche. Il fournit des informations sur
les erreurs lors des opérations simultanées et des suggestions sur comment et où synchroniser
les opérations. Dans ce rapport, nous présentons deux fonctionnalités de l’outil : la première
fournit un contre-exemple lors du débogage et la seconde des suggestions permettant un meilleur
contrôle de concurrence.
Mots-clés : cohérence, vérification, applications distribuées
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1 Introduction
Reasoning about the correctness of distributed applications while ensuring high availability is
a non-trivial task. CISE, introduced by Gotsman et al. [1], is a logic for reasoning about the
correctness of a distributed application operating on top of a causally-consistent database. In
cases where the developer needs to control concurrent operations, he/she can use concurrency
control named tokens. According to the CISE logic, a distributed application is guaranteed to
uphold its invariant if:
1. Each operation is sequentially correct.
2. The precondition of each operation is stable under any concurrent operation.
3. Concurrent operations commute.
Based on the CISE logic, a first tool was developed by Najafzadeh et al. [2]. This initial CISE
tool is difficult because the user needs to use the low-level Z3 APIs directly [3]. Subsequently,
Marcelino, Balegas, and Ferreira [4] designed a second generation CISE tool, called Correct Even-
tual Consistency (CEC), which works on the same principle and provides a high-level developer
friendly verification language, an extension of Boogie [5] with specific annotations.
An application written as a CEC specification consists of the following parts:
• Data structures and properties
• Variables
• Invariants
• Operations with pre and post conditions
The tool first checks the specification for errors in the sequential specification. The first step
checks whether:
• Each individual component of the specification is syntactically correct (syntax check).
• Each operation satisfies the invariant individually (safety check).
• The specification contains any contradictory clauses (anomaly check).
• Every variable that is modified by an operation has a properly defined value when the
operation terminates (completeness check).
If the first phase passes, the analysis proceeds onto the second stage to check for concurrency.
This stage verifies the CISE consistency conditions. It checks every pair of operations to see
whether:
• The two operations of the pair have opposing preconditions including the tokens they
acquire (opposition check). If so, they will never run concurrently. Otherwise (the two
operations can run concurrently), the next two checks are applied.
• The precondition of one operation is preserved even under concurrent execution of the other
operation with tokens (stability check). According to the CISE logic, this check ensures
that the application’s invariant is preserved.
• The two operations commute (commutativity check). This ensures convergence.
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A first report on the evaluation of the tool is available [6]. The current paper documents the
improvements since the previous report in the following areas:
• Counter example for failed verification.
• Optimized token generation.
2 Counterexample for failed verification
The previous report[6] highlighted the lack of a counterexample when a verification fails.
The tool informed the user about the type of check that failed, it was difficult for the user to
understand why. The improved version of the tool now provides a counterexample with the
following information:
• The statement that failed.
• The values of the parameters of the operation.
• The values of all the variables in the failed expression.
Let us illustrate with an example of a bank account. It has two operations - deposit and
withdraw. Suppose that the developer has specified a precondition for withdraw operation, but
not for deposit.
@init
type Cl i en t ;
@var iab le s
var ba lances : [ C l i en t ] int ;
@equals [ C l i en t ] int @as f o ra l l c : C l i en t : : @this [ c ] == @other [ c ] ;
@invar iant
f o ra l l c : C l i en t : : ba lances [ c ] >= 0 ;
@operat ions
procedure depos i t ( accountId : Cl ient , amount : int )
modifies ba lances ;
ensures
fora l l c : C l i en t : :
( ( c != accountId ) ==> ( ba lances [ c ] == old ( ba lances ) [ c ] ) ) &&
( ( c == accountId ) ==> ( ba lances [ accountId ] == old ( ba lances ) [ accountId ]
+ amount ) ) ;
procedure withdraw ( accountId : Cl ient , amount : int )
modifies ba lances ;
requires ba lances [ accountId ] − amount >= 0 ;
ensures
fora l l c : C l i en t : :
( ( c != accountId ) ==> ( ba lances [ c ] == old ( ba lances ) [ c ] ) ) &&
( ( c == accountId ) ==> ( ba lances [ accountId ] == old ( ba lances ) [ accountId ]
− amount ) ) ;
The @init includes the initialization section of the specification. This sections contains
datatype declarations, axioms and function declarations. In our case, there is a single datatype
declaration here. The next section, @variable contains all the variables used in the specification.
The variable we use here is a mapping from each Client to their balance (which is an integer).
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The section @equals gives the guidance to the tool about how to compare two variables for
equality. In this specification, two variables of type [Client]int as considered equal if each
Client has the same balance. The application invariant here is that the balances should always
be non-negative. @invariant states this application invariant and @operations contains a list
of operations of the application. Each operation will have a precondition which should be true
at the origin replica (denoted by requires clause) and the effector function which is the result of
executing the operation (denoted by the ensures clause).
The tool performs an analysis on this specification. In this case the safety test fails during the
first stage (verifying the sequential specification). The tool returns information on the assertion
that failed, and the values of the variables involved in the assertion. It also provides the values
of the parameters of the failing operation. Below is the corresponding output of the failure.
############## SPECIFICATION CORRECTION TESTS ##############
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−BASE VERIFICATION−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
IMPORTS TEST: (PASSED)
INITIALIZER TEST: (PASSED)
VARIABLES TEST: (PASSED)
INVARIANTS TEST: (PASSED)
depos i t OPERATION TEST: (PASSED)
withdraw OPERATION TEST: (PASSED)
FULL TEST: (PASSED)
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−SEQUENTIAL VERIFICATION−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
depos i t SAFETY TEST: (FAILED)
DEBUG INFO :
The statements which f a i l e d are : : :
ensure s ( f o r a l l c : C l i en t : : ba lances [ c ] >= 0) ;
assume ( f o r a l l c : C l i en t : : ba lances [ c ] >= 0) ;
The value o f accountId i s T@Client ! va l ! 0 .
The value o f ba lances i s |T@[ C l i en t ] Int ! va l ! 1 | .
The value o f amount i s (− 1200) .
The value o f c i s .
The value o f C l i en t i s .
withdraw SAFETY TEST: (PASSED)
depos i t ABSURD TEST: (PASSED)
withdraw ABSURD TEST: (PASSED)
depos i t COMPLETENESS TEST: (PASSED)
withdraw COMPLETENESS TEST: (PASSED)
FAILED LOGIC SPECIFICATION CORRECTION TEST
EXECUTION STOPPED
The first section of the result, the base verification, performs a syntax check for each part of
the specification. The second part, the sequential verification checks whether the specification is
safe sequentially.
The result tells that the tool was unable to verify that deposit operation ensures a positive
balance, the application invariant. The parameters of the failing deposit operation are amount
and accountId. The value of amount is -1200, a negative value. The developer takes this as a hint
that negative values for amount are problematic. To test this hypothesis, he adds a precondition
to indicate that amount should be positive. Then the specification looks like the following:
@init
type Cl i en t ;
@var iab le s
var ba lances : [ C l i en t ] int ;
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@equals [ C l i en t ] int @as f o ra l l c : C l i en t : : @this [ c ] == @other [ c ] ;
@invar iant
f o ra l l c : C l i en t : : ba lances [ c ] >= 0 ;
@operat ions
procedure depos i t ( accountId : Cl ient , amount : int )
modifies ba lances ;
requires amount >= 0 ;
ensures
fora l l c : C l i en t : :
( ( c != accountId ) ==> ( ba lances [ c ] == old ( ba lances ) [ c ] ) ) &&
( ( c == accountId ) ==> ( ba lances [ accountId ] == old ( ba lances ) [ accountId ]
+ amount ) ) ;
procedure withdraw ( accountId : Cl ient , amount : int )
modifies ba lances ;
requires ba lances [ accountId ] − amount >= 0 ;
ensures
fora l l c : C l i en t : :
( ( c != accountId ) ==> ( ba lances [ c ] == old ( ba lances ) [ c ] ) ) &&
( ( c == accountId ) ==> ( ba lances [ accountId ] == old ( ba lances ) [ accountId ]
− amount ) ) ;
Now we rerun the tool with the corrected specification. We can see that the sequential safety
test passes and we get the following result.
############## SPECIFICATION CORRECTION TESTS ##############
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−BASE VERIFICATION−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
IMPORTS TEST: (PASSED)
INITIALIZER TEST: (PASSED)
VARIABLES TEST: (PASSED)
INVARIANTS TEST: (PASSED)
depos i t OPERATION TEST: (PASSED)
withdraw OPERATION TEST: (PASSED)
FULL TEST: (PASSED)
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−SEQUENTIAL VERIFICATION−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
depos i t SAFETY TEST: (PASSED)
withdraw SAFETY TEST: (PASSED)
depos i t ABSURD TEST: (PASSED)
withdraw ABSURD TEST: (PASSED)
depos i t COMPLETENESS TEST: (PASSED)
withdraw COMPLETENESS TEST: (PASSED)
############## CONSISTENCY TESTS ##############
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−PAIR OPPOSITION VERIFICATION−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
depos i t depo s i t OPPOSITION TEST: (PASSED)
depos i t withdraw OPPOSITION TEST: (PASSED)
withdraw withdraw OPPOSITION TEST: (PASSED)
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−PAIR STABILITY VERIFICATION−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
depos i t depo s i t STABILITY TEST: (PASSED)
depos i t withdraw STABILITY TEST: (PASSED)
withdraw withdraw STABILITY TEST: (FAILED)
DEBUG INFO :
The statements which f a i l e d are : : :
r e q u i r e s ( ba lances [ accountId ] − amount >= 0) ;
assume ( f o r a l l c : C l i en t : : ba lances [ c ] >= 0) ;
The value o f accountId i s T@Client ! va l ! 0 , T@Client ! va l ! 0 .
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The value o f ba lances i s |T@[ C l i en t ] Int ! va l ! 0 | .
The value o f amount i s 797 ,797 .
The value o f c i s .
The value o f C l i en t i s .
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−PAIR COMMUTATIVITY VERIFICATION−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
depos i t depo s i t COMMUTATIVITY TEST: (PASSED)
depos i t withdraw COMMUTATIVITY TEST: (PASSED)
The stability test failed for concurrent withdraw operations. Indeed, the precondition of the
second withdraw is not stable under the execution of the first. We can see that he values of
accountId are the same for both operations. This a hint for the developer to insert concurrency
control for concurrent withdraw operations for the same accountId.
3 Synthesis of concurrency control
The tool now leverages the counterexample obtained in Section 2 to suggest a concurrency
control token.
Let us continue with our bank account example. From the counter example, the tool infers
two possible restrictions:
• The amounts should be different
and/or
• The accountIds should be different
The tool automatically reruns the analysis with these added restrictions. Even when the two
amounts are different, the analysis still violates the stability check. Therefore this is not a fruitful
excercise. When the accountIds are constarined to be different the specification passes the sta-
bility test. This shows that concurrent withdraws to different accounts are ok, and suggests that
concurrency should be disallowed for the same accountId. The CISE abstract for concurrency
control is called a token.
The output of the token generator is :
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−COUNTER EXAMPLE GUIDED SOLVER−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
withdraw ( accountId : Cl ient , amount : i n t ) withdraw ( accountId : Cl ient , amount :
i n t ) COUNTER EXAMPLE GUIDED SOLVER: (PASSED)
So lu t i on s :
( @1 != @3 )
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−TOKEN MODEL−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Tokens per ope ra t i on s :
withdraw : withdraw_accountId
Token c o n f l i c t s :
withdraw_accountId : withdraw_accountId
The first part of the output tells that in the list of parameters, the first parameter should not
be equal to the third one. The token model presents the same information grouped in the form
of tokens needed for each operation and conflicts for each token. This complies with the token
specifications in CISE. The token model tells that withdraw operation needs to acquire a token
for each account_id. For a developer, this means the withdraw operations operating on one
account_id need to synchronize.
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4 Conclusion
This report summarises some recent improvements made on the Correct Eventual Consistency
(CEC) tool. The tool now provides more comprehensible counter examples. The tool also
suggests tokens by utilising the information from the counter examples in an optimized fashion.
Currently the tool is providing suggestions only based on imposing inequality restrictions on
the parameters. This can be improved considering more relations between parameters. The
next step would be to develop a complementary tool for analysing the applications which use
state-based update propagation mechanism.
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